We assume that all individuals start out with an equal level of "initial fitness" that we will denote F 0 (usually, it's simplest to simply assume F 0 = 0. We will denote the outcome of the non-zero sum game when player one uses strategy s 1 and player two uses strategy s 2 by ∆F (s 1 , s 2 ). When a population of game players is divided between two strategies s 1 and s 2 , and the proportion of the population using strategy s 2 is p, then we will denote the overall fitness of an individual using strategy s i as:
Note that in this definition, we implicitly assume that the game in question is symmetric (i.e., the game is identical if player one and player two switch roles).
This formula assumes that over a period of time an individual using strategy s i will encounter and play the non-zero sum game represented by ∆F with a large number of other individuals (and these individuals will be a representative sample of the overall population, so they will employ strategy s 2 with probability p).
Also, observe that the definition requires that the "mutant" strategy µ to thrive in a population dominated by strategy σ. It is conceivable that a strategy µ might do well compared to σ when it comprises say p = 0.8 of the population but poorly when the strategy is used by only a small percentage of the population. Such a strategy does not show that σ is not an ESS because in this case, should the population ever be dominated by individuals using strategy σ, µ would never be able to gain a "foothold" and grow in the population to the point where it becomes viable.
Definition. A [possibly mixed] strategy σ in a two person non-zero sum game is an evolutionary stable strategy or ESS if and only if for every competing strategy µ = σ there exists an > 0 such that for every choice of 0 < p < ,
Observation 2. A [possibly mixed] strategy σ is an ESS if and only if for every
Proof. If condition (i) holds, then σ is an ESS by the previous observation. If condition (ii) holds, then for any p > 0,
For the converse, note first that if ∆F (σ, σ) = ∆F (µ, σ) but ∆F (σ, µ) ≤ ∆F (µ, µ), then the above equation is at most 0 and so shows that σ is not an ESS. It remains to show only that when there is a strategy µ such that ∆F (σ, σ) < ∆F (µ, σ), σ is not an ESS. This argument is similar to Observation 1, but in this case D < 0 and we choose = min(1,
Example. Consider the following game:
First, we test for a pure strategy ESS. Let σ be the "always choose Hawk" strategy, and let µ be "always choose dove." We calculate F (σ) and F (µ) for an arbitrary p < 1. For simplicity, we assume that F 0 = 0.
Some simple arithmetic shows that whenever p ≤ 1 3 , F (D) ≥ F (H). In other words, when at most one third of the population is passive, it's better to remain passive. To see that µ is not an ESS, we note that the dual of the above equations show that whenver q = 1 − p ≤ 2 3 , we have F (σ) ≥ F (µ). So when at most two thirds of the population is aggressive, the best strategy is to be aggressive and exploit the passive part of the population.
Note that when exactly one third of the population is Dove-ish, then it the fitness of the pure-Dove and pure-Hawk strategies are equal. This suggests the principle of indifference that we used in the study of zero sum games. Perhaps a mixed strategy that uses Hawk two thirds of the time and Dove one third of the time will be ESS?
Let σ be the mixed strategy that uses Hawk with probability q = 2 3 . If we assume that σ is not an ESS, then for some strategy µ = σ we must have F (µ) ≥ F (σ). Let µ be such a strategy which uses Hawk with probability q m (note that by allowing q m = 0 or q m = 1 we can capture pure strategies as well).
First we will compute the expected outcomes of ∆F (σ, σ) and ∆F (µ, σ).
Since these values are equal for an arbitrary µ, they must be equal for every possibly strategy µ. Now, by Observation 2 above, we know that σ is an ESS if and only if ∆F (σ, µ) > ∆F (µ, µ) or ∆F (σ, µ) − ∆F (µµ) > 0 Thus, we compute these values: 
